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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Gary Louis Coe appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon a jury 
verdict finding him guilty of aggravated assault and use of a deadly weapon during the 
commission of a felony. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
According to the presentence report ("PSI"), the facts underlying Coe's 
convictions for aggravated assault and exhibition of a deadly weapon are as follows: 
Shortly after 9:30 p.m. on November 15, 2010, Post Falls Police 
responded to the "Falls Club" following report that the business owner had 
taken a .357 revolver (containing 5-live and one spent/fired rounds of 
ammunition) away from patron/defendant Coe (age 67) who had since left 
the tavern with his wife) [sic]. The owner told police that defendant had 
argued with a patron (victim Phil Pellerin/age 49), followed by the two men 
exiting the premise to the parking lot - victim the follower. The tavern 
owner also exited moments later to observe defendant standing in the 
parking lot aiming his handgun at the victim, at which time he lunged at 
defendant to divert its use and the gun discharged into the air. The victim 
was interviewed, and generally corroborated information told police by the 
business owner. The victim admitted to a brief verbal argument, 
challenging defendant to go outside to 'settle it', and then doing so (not in 
fear of the elder-aged defendant). Police then travelled to defendant's 
residence and interviewed him. Defendant reported the argument 
concerned the victim and another patron 'hitting on' his niece who was 
present at the bar, and when challenged by the victim he exited to his 
truck to retrieve his handgun. He reported pointing it (to be "prepared") 
when the victim reached toward his (coat) pocket. When police asked 
defendant why he did not just leave in his truck to avoid the confrontation, 
he told police he had been "challenged" - had "stepped up to the 
situation" hoping to be "quicker on the draw" (if needed) - using the 
weapon to instill fear (not necessarily intent on using it) as a means to end 
to [sic] the confrontation/circumstance. 
(PSI, p.2.) 
1 
The state charged Coe with aggravated assault and with using a deadly weapon 
during the commission of that offense. (R., pp.41-42.) At trial, a jury convicted Coe of 
aggravated assault and found that he committed the offense with a deadly weapon. (R., 
pp.129-130.) The district court sentenced Coe to a unified term of ten years with two 
years fixed, and suspended that sentence and placed Coe on probation for two years. 
(R., pp.140-145.) Coe filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.146-149.) 
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ISSUES 
Coe states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Was Mr. Coe harmed by the District Court's error in refusing to 
allow Mr. Coe to present evidence of his reputation for being kind, 
caring and generous? 
B. Was Mr. Coe harmed by the District Court's error in refusing to 
instruct the jury as requested by Mr. Coe? 
C. Did the combination of errors and irregularities deprive Mr. Coe of 
his due process right to a fair trial? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The State rephrases the issue as: 
1. Has Coe failed to show the district court erred by excluding, under I.R.E. 404(a), 
evidence that he is kind, caring, and generous? 
2. Has Coe failed to show error in the jury instructions? 




Coe Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Excluding, Under I.R.E. 404(a), 
Evidence That He Is Kind, Caring, And Generous 
A. Introduction 
Coe contends the district court abused its discretion in excluding his proposed 
character witnesses from testifying. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-7.) Coe's argument fails, 
however, because the district court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that 
the proposed testimony that Coe is a kind, caring, and generous person was not 
relevant to the elements of aggravated assault and exhibition of a deadly weapon. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence 
and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only when there has been 
a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Howard, 135 Idaho 727, 721, 24 P.3d 44, 48 
(2001);Statev. Robinett, 141 ldaho110, 112, 106P.3d436,438(2005). 
C. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Excluding Coe's Proposed 
Character Testimony, Under I.R.E. 404(a). That He Is Kind, Caring, And 
Generous 
Character evidence ordinarily is inadmissible for the purpose of showing that an 
individual acted in conformity therewith on any particular occasion. I.R.E. 404(a); State 
v. Rupp, 118 Idaho 17, 19, 794 P.2d 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Harvey, 142 
Idaho 527, 533, 129 P.3d 1276, 1282 (Ct. App. 2006). A criminal defendant may, 
however, offer evidence of a pertinent character trait, provided the prosecution is 
afforded an opportunity to rebut the same. I.R.E. 404(a)(1); .fu!QQ, 118 Idaho at 19, 794 
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P.2d at 289. For example, one charged with theft may offer evidence of honesty. State 
v. Bailey, 117 Idaho 941, 942, 792 P .2d 966, 967 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing State v. Kramp. 
200 Mont. 383, 651 P.2d 614, 618 (1982). In Bailey, the Idaho Court of Appeals held 
that evidence that Bailey only drank alcohol in moderation was not relevant to the 
elements of his DUI charge because a person need not drink excessively to be 
convicted of DUI, he only needs only to be shown to have consumed alcohol which 
perceptibly impaired his ability to drive. Bailey, 117 Idaho at 943, 792 P.2d at 968. In 
the more recent case of State v. Rothwell, 2012 WL 53731 (Idaho App. 2012), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held that, in Rothwell's trial for lewd and lascivious conduct, the district 
court erred (harmlessly) by excluding opinion or reputation testimony that Rothwell was 
"trustworthy with preteen children," following the majority rule of other states that "traits 
relating to a defendant's sexual morality with children are pertinent" to cases involving 
sexual misconduct with a child, id., at *3. 
In short, pertinent trait evidence under I.R.E. 404(a) cannot be admitted unless it 
is relevant to the elements of the crime charged. Bailey, 117 Idaho at 942, 792 P.2d at 
967. Evidence is relevant if it increases the likelihood that a fact at issue did or did not 
occur. I.R.E. 401. In this case, after Coe's attorney asked Todd Bartlett "what kind of 
person [Coe] is," the prosecutor objected and Coe's counsel made an offer of proof 
outside the jury's presence, followed by a discussion between both counsel and the 
court, to wit: 
THE COURT: ... What particular character trait is going to be offered by 
this witness? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would expect he and other 
witnesses would offer the character traits of [Coe] as a generous, kind, 
giving person. . . . Just that he is a good person, a kind person, a giving 
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person, a caring person - I'm sorry. I'm getting a whisper here - and a 
nonviolent person. 
THE COURT: How would character for kind [sic] - or for giving and caring 
be relevant? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Those are nice, peaceful character traits. I think 
I can put his character in issue under 404(a)(1 ). 
THE COURT: Any response from the state? 
[PROSECUTOR]: I think the only one that might be admissible, your 
Honor, is his character for violence or not violence. I think that's it. 
THE COURT: I agree for [sic] character trait for peacefulness is 
admissible. Character for kind, giving, and caring is not relevant and is 
not admissible. And general goodness is not admissible, but character 
trait for peacefulness is admissible. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I will the need to be able to ask the 
witnesses a more leading type of question to direct them to that answer. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All my witnesses have lots of really good stories 
to say about [Coe] and I don't want to run afoul with the Court's ruling. 
THE COURT: Sure. The Court exercises its discretion in ruling, so 
because the language of 404(a)(1) is evidence of a pertinent trait, and the 
Court finds the pertinent trait in this issue to be whether the defendant is 
peaceful or not. 
(Tr., p.101, Ls.11-14; p.103, L.17-p.105, L.3.) 
Application of the standards of relevance under I.R.E. 404(a) and 401 shows no 
error by the district court. Although the qualities of being kind, caring, and generous 
may overlap in differing ways what it means to be peaceful, it is the only trait of 
"peacefulness" that refutes the elements of aggravated assault - which is based on 
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threatening to do violence. 1 Conversely, to the extent the terms "kind, caring, and 
generous" differ in meaning from "peacefulness," they are not relevant to the crimes 
Coe committed. 
Inasmuch as the district court permitted Coe to introduce testimony that he is a 
peaceful person (see Tr., p.105, Ls.20-23) - the only trait that is pertinent to aggravated 
assault -- the court did not err in refusing Coe's request to also show he is kind, caring 
and generous. Coe has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
excluding his proposed character evidence. 
1 Jury Instruction No. 11 set out the elements necessary to prove Coe committed 
aggravated assault as: 
1. On or about 15th [sic] day of November, 201 O; 
2. in the state of Idaho; 
3. the defendant GARY LOUIS COE committed an assault on Phil 
Pellerin; 
4. the defendant committed that assault with a deadly weapon or 
instrument. 
(R., p.115 (emphasis original).) In Jury Instruction No. 12, the jury was next instructed: 
An "assault" is committed when a person; 
Intentionally and unlawfully threatens by word or act to do violence to the 
person of another, with the apparent ability to do so, and does some act 
which creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is 
imminent. 
(R., p.116 (emphasis added).) 
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D. Even If The District Court Erred In Excluding The Testimony, Such Error Was 
Harmless 
'"Where error concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test [for harmless error] is 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence might have 
contributed to the conviction."' State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201, 
1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho 207, 209, 804 P.2d 936, 938 (Ct. 
App. 1991 )). The district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the opinion 
or reputation testimony that Coe was kind, caring, and generous. However, even if the 
court erred, the exclusion of such testimony was harmless because there is no 
reasonable probability that the error contributed to the jury's verdict. For the reasons 
discussed above, the proposed character testimony had, at best, minimal relevance to 
the elements of aggravated assault. The jury was already informed by Todd Bartlett 
that Coe is a very peaceful person. Adding that Coe was also "kind, caring and 
generous" would not have impacted the jury any more than being told he was peaceful, 
considering the charge Coe faced was based on a lack of peacefulness. There is no 




Coe Has Failed To Show Error In The Jury Instructions 
A. Introduction 
Coe argues that the district court erroneously instructed the jury as to the 
elements on which it could find him guilty of aggravated assault. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.7-10.) Coe claims on appeal, as he did during trial, that by separately instructing the 
jury on the elements of aggravated assault and the definition of "assault," the jury could 
have become confused and convicted him without finding the victim had a well-founded 
fear that the violence Coe threatened was imminent. (Appellant's Brief, p.8; see 
Amended Tr., p.12, L.23 - p.13, L.14; Jury Instructions Nos. 11 and 12, fn. 1, supra.) 
Coe's claim on appeal fails. 
Contrary to Coe's argument, the instructions as given were not confusing and did 
not, as he claims, confuse the jury or lessen the state's burden of proof. The jury 
instructions, as a whole, correctly stated the law and did not mislead the jury. Coe has 
failed to show that the instructions were in any way erroneous, and has also failed to 
show that the error he claims so distorted the trial as to result in a violation of his due 
process rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 
853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 
(2000)). "An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the 
instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." State v. Shackelford, 150 
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Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010) (citing Kuhn v. Proctor, 141 Idaho 459, 
462, 111 P.3d 144, 147 (2005)). Jury instructions are reviewed as a whole because "[i]t 
is well established that [an] instruction 'may not be judged in artificial isolation,' but must 
be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record." Estelle 
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 
(1973)). 
C. The District Court Correctly Instructed The Jury On The Elements Of Aggravated 
Assault 
It is not reversible error to instruct a jury on the elements of a crime by providing 
the statutory language related to that crime. Holland v. Peterson, 95 Idaho 728, 518 
P.2d 1190 (1974); LaRue v. Archer, 130 Idaho 267, 271, 939 P.2d 586, 590 (Ct. App. 
1997). The elements of aggravated assault (as applicable to this case) are (1) an 
intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of another, 
coupled with (a) an apparent ability to do so, and (b) doing some act which creates a 
well-founded fear in such person that such violence is imminent, and (2) committing the 
foregoing with a deadly weapon or instrument. I.C. §§ 18-901 (b), 18-905(a); see also 
State v. Cudd, 137 Idaho 625, 627, 51 P.3d 439 (Ct. App. 2002). The district court 
instructed the jury accordingly. 
Jury Instruction Nos. 11 and 12, read together, properly instructed the jury as to 
the elements of aggravated assault. (R., pp.115-116.) Instruction Nos. 11 and 12 are 
simply Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions 1201 (defining assault) and 1205 (aggravated 
assault), with the addition of information from the current case. Although Coe appears 
to concede that the jury instructions were correct, he contends that separating the 
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definition of assault (Instr. No. 12) from the elements instruction (Instr. No. 11) could 
have caused the jury to become confused by having "to refer elsewhere for that 
definition." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Coe provides no specific authority to support his 
argument that having a jury refer to another instruction for a definition of a term in an 
elements instruction presents any problem, or would confuse a jury. (See Appellant's 
Brief, pp.7-10.) To the contrary, because the district court instructed the jury in this 
case on the elements of assault and aggravated assault by using the statutory 
language, and did so in immediate sequence, Coe's claim of error is without merit. 
The district court rejected Coe's argument, explaining: 
The Court has exercised its discretion in giving what is now jury instruction 
No. 11 and rejecting defendant's proposed No. 7 for a couple of reasons, 
one of which is it is the recommended - the one that the Court's giving is 
the recommended Supreme Court-approved instruction on aggravated 
assault. And the Court tried to address counsel's concern by making the 
definition of assault, which includes the language of the fear and the well-
founded fear, as instruction No. 12 so that it follows immediately after No. 
11. So essentially, 11 gives the elements of aggravated assault as being 
the date and the state and the defendant committing an assault. And then 
with a deadly weapon, No. 12 then defines assault including the fear. 
(Amended Tr., p.13, L.18-p.14, L.6.) 
As the district court concluded, the jury instructions, as a whole, properly 
instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated assault. See Shackelford, 150 Idaho 
at 373-74, 247 P.3d at 600-601; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. The jury was appropriately 
instructed that it must "consider [the instructions] as a whole, not picking out one and 
disregarding others. The order in which the instructions are given has no significance 
as to their relative importance." (R., p.105 (Instr. No. 3).) It is presumed that the jury 
followed those instructions. State v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 802, 932 P.2d 907, 925 (Ct. 
App. 1997) ("It is presumed that the jury follows the instructions of the trial court."). Coe 
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has failed to show error because, as the district court determined, the instructions did in 
fact require the jury to find "the language of the fear and the well-founded fear" found in 
Instruction No. 12, and the jury is presumed to have followed those instructions. 
(Amended Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.2) 
In sum, the instruction defining assault, together with the elements instruction for 
aggravated assault, required the jury to find that the state had proven Coe's threatened 
violence created "a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is 
imminent." (R., p.116.) Coe's claim of error is thus without merit. 
111. 
Coe Has Failed To Demonstrate Cumulative Error 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 
125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of 
the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 
Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Coe has failed to show any error, much less 
two or more errors. Thus, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in this case. 
See,~. LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997). 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Coe's convictions for 
aggravated assault and exhibition of a deadly weapon. 
DATED this 11th day of February, 2013. 
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